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INTRODUCTION
On May 26, 2020, then-President Trump tweeted out concerns about
mail-in voting and the potential, as he saw it, that “[m]ail boxes will be
robbed, ballots will be forged & even illegally printed out & fraudulently
signed.”1 As part of its new policy on misleading content, Twitter applied
a label to the tweet directing users to “[g]et the facts about mail-in
ballots.”2 When users clicked the link, they were directed to a tweet from
the account @TwitterSafety that advised users of the platform’s “civic
integrity policy.”3 Twitter’s response to the President’s tweet stated that
it “could confuse voters about what they need to do to receive a ballot
and participate in the election process.”4
On May 28, 2020, President Trump issued an Executive Order titled
“Preventing Online Censorship,” motivated by “troubling behaviors” by
social media platforms “engaging in selective censorship that is harming
our national discourse.”5 These troubling behaviors include “‘flagging’
content as inappropriate, even though it does not violate any stated terms
1 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TRUMP TWITTER ARCHIVE V2 (May 26, 2020, 8:17
AM),
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22illegally+printed+out+%22
[https://perma.cc/G4LS-6425]. Trump was permanently banned from Twitter on January 8, 2021
for tweets relating to the January 6, 2021 attack at the United States Capitol, and all his tweets were
deleted from the platform. See Twitter Inc. (@Twitter), Permanent Suspension of
@realDonaldTrump, TWITTER BLOG (Jan. 8, 2021), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/
company/2020/suspension [https://perma.cc/D2Q7-A4A8].
2 Trump, supra note 1; Dan Mangan & Kevin Breuninger, Twitter Fact-Checks Trump, Slaps

Warning Labels on His Tweets About Mail-In Ballots, CNBC (May 26, 2020, 6:12 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/26/twitter-fact-checks-trump-slaps-warning-labels-on-his-tweetsabout-mail-in-ballots.html [https://perma.cc/5BD5-FPM3]. See also Twitter Safety
(@TwitterSafety), TWITTER (May 27, 2020, 10:54 PM), https://twitter.com/TwitterSafety/status/
1265838823663075341?s=20 [https://perma.cc/FNC3-G5GD]; Yoel Roth & Nick Pickles,
Updating Our Approach to Misleading Information, TWITTER BLOG (May 11, 2020),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2020/updating-our-approach-to-misleadinginformation [https://perma.cc/FWB7-CPLF].
3 Twitter Safety, supra note 2; Mangan & Breuninger, supra note 2.
4 Twitter Safety, supra note 2.
5 Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020).
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of service” and “deleting content and entire accounts with no warning, no
rationale, and no recourse.”6 Specifically, the Order accuses Twitter of
“selectively decid[ing] to place a warning label on certain tweets in a
manner that clearly reflects political bias.”7
The Order directed the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) to file a rulemaking petition with the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to seek clarification of a
particularly contentious provision of the Communications Decency Act:
Section 230.8 That Section provides “Good Samaritan” immunity for
online hosts of third-party content that make a “good faith” effort to
“restrict access” to indecent, illegal, or “otherwise objectionable”
content.9
In his Order, the President alleged that the Good Samaritan
provision is often “distorted to provide liability protection for online
platforms that . . . engage in deceptive or pretextual actions . . . to stifle
viewpoints with which they disagree.”10 The Order sought to prevent this
abuse by clarifying the meaning of “good faith” and whether actions not
in good faith will disqualify a platform from immunity.11
The President’s Order joined a chorus of political voices, mostly
Republican, raising cries of politically biased content moderation on
social media platforms.12 On the other side, Democrats have also
complained that Section 230 does little to curb the spread of child
exploitation content or political disinformation.13 Taken together, these
arguments illustrate that Section 230 is critically flawed because social
media platforms can abuse their immunity to moderate content in a biased
or unfair manner, while not following through with the underlying
purposes of Section 230: preserving free speech and making the Internet
safer.14
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Id.
Id.
Id. at 34,081.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
Exec. Order No. 13,925, supra note 5, at 34,080.
Id. at 34,081.
Edward Lee, Moderating Content Moderation: A Framework for Nonpartisanship in

Online Governance, 70 AM. U. L. REV. 913, 941 (2021) (pointing out that the majority of
legislative proposals dealing with biased content moderation were put forward by Republicans).
13 Marguerite Reardon, Democrats and Republicans Agree that Section 230 Is Flawed, CNET
(June 21, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/democrats-and-republicans-agree-thatsection-230-is-flawed [https://perma.cc/T7RM-TKVG].
14 “It is the policy of the United States . . . (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free
market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation; . . . (4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to
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The 116th Congress saw a flurry of activity to amend—or
eliminate—Section 230. Eighteen bills were put forward between the
House and Senate,15 though not one saw any action in committee.16 While
the bills vary in their specific policy goals, they share similar approaches,
including conditioning immunity on fair enforcement of terms of use and
narrowing the category of “otherwise objectionable” content subject to
protected Good Samaritan removal.17 Some proposals offer more robust
statutory schemes, while others change as little as a few words of Section
230.18
Despite the vast menu of options for fixing Section 230, Congress
has taken no action toward resolving the issue.19 This Note will build a
comprehensive solution out of the variety of legislative proposals, with
the goal of accomplishing the dual purposes of Section 230. Part I will
summarize the history of Section 230 and illustrate through judicial
decisions the legal dilemma that has arisen in applying the statutory
immunity. Part II will survey notable legislative, executive, and academic
solutions that have been put forward so far and identify those that will
best promote free speech online while incentivizing platforms to combat
illegal content. Part III will lay out some legal guidelines for structuring
a proposal, while Part IV will weave all the strands together to create a
proposal for a legislative solution that will more effectively promote

objectionable or inappropriate online material; and (5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of
computer.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b). See also Reardon, supra note 13.
15 See Limiting Section 230 Immunity to Good Samaritans Act, H.R. 8596, 116th Cong. (2020);
Don’t Push My Buttons Act, H.R. 8515, 116th Cong. (2020); AOC Act, H.R. 8896, 116th Cong.
(2020); Protecting Americans from Dangerous Algorithms Act, H.R. 8636, 116th Cong. (2020);
Stop the Censorship Act, H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2019); CASE-IT Act, H.R. 8719, 116th Cong.
(2020); Stop the Censorship Act of 2020, H.R. 7808, 116th Cong. (2020); Protect Speech Act, H.R.
8517, 116th Cong. (2020); S. 5020, 116th Cong. (2020); S. 5085, 116th Cong. (2020); Limiting
Section 230 Immunity to Good Samaritans Act, S. 3983, 116th Cong. (2020); Stop Suppressing
Speech Act of 2020, S. 4828, 116th Cong. (2020); Don’t Push My Buttons Act, S. 4756, 116th
Cong. (2020); Online Freedom and Viewpoint Diversity Act, S. 4534, 116th Cong. (2020); Holding
Sexual Predators and Online Enablers Accountable Act of 2020, S. 5012, 116th Cong. (2020);
Stopping Big Tech’s Censorship Act, S. 4062, 116th Cong. (2020); Ending Support for Internet
Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019); Platform Accountability and Consumer
Transparency (PACT) Act, S. 4066, 116th Cong. (2020).
16 Congress.gov, LIBR. OF CONG., https://congress.gov (search for “Section 230,” limit search
by “Legislation,” select “116 (2019–2020)” Congress, and use “tracker” function under each bill
to observe that none of the bills has been through any committee hearings) (last visited Nov. 22,
2021).
17 See, e.g., S. 3983, 116th Cong. (2020); S. 4062, 116th Cong. (2020); H.R. 8517, 116th Cong.
(2020); S. 4534, 116th Cong. (2020); S. 4828, 116th Cong. (2020); H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2019).
18 For examples of bills that present new statutory schemes, see S. 4066, 116th Cong. (2020);
S. 4062, 116th Cong. (2020). For proposals that modify only a few words, see, for example, S.
4828, 116th Cong. (2020), and H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2019).
19 See Congress.gov, supra note 16.
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Section 230’s purposes: to protect free speech and make the Internet
safer.20
I. BACKGROUND: ABOUT SECTION 230
A.

The Communications Decency Act

The Communications Decency Act (CDA) was first passed in 1996
with the goal of protecting children from obscene and indecent content
online by imposing criminal penalties on those who knowingly
transmitted this content “over any telecommunications device, including
the Internet.”21 Shortly before the bill was passed, it was amended to
include immunity for online platforms that hosted third-party content.22
This provision was geared at resolving a critical First Amendment issue
that arose with the advent of the Internet: whether an online platform
could be liable for the defamatory or illegal content of third parties.23
Before the advent of Internet publishing, First Amendment doctrine
assigned liability for the publication of defamatory content based on a
distinction between publishers, distributors, and platforms.24 Publishers,
like newspapers, exercise a degree of editorial control over their content
and are liable for publishing defamatory content created by a third party
only upon a showing of actual malice.25 Distributors, like bookstores and
newsstands, are not expected to have reviewed every item they sell but
can be liable if they are given notice of defamatory content and refuse to
remove it.26 A platform, such as a telephone service provider, is
categorically immune from liability for third-party defamatory content.27
As Internet-based forums made it possible for nearly anyone to post
their opinion online, the legal distinctions regarding defamation—
especially between a publisher and a distributor—became more difficult

47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
Communications Decency Act Section 230 Immunity, LEXISNEXIS (Oct. 18, 2021)
[hereinafter Section 230 Immunity], https://plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/22d96624-25eb-44dfb87d-642cd7b3ae29/?context=1530671.
22 See id.
23 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
24 Eugene Volokh, 47 U.S.C. § 230 and the Publisher/Distributor/Platform Distinction,
REASON (May 28, 2020, 11:44 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/05/28/47-u-s-c-%C2%A7230-and-the-publisher-distributor-platform-distinction [https://perma.cc/LA6V-TUPD].
25 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (stating that actual malice in a
publishing context is “knowledge that [the statement] was false or . . . reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not”).
26 See Janklow v. Viking Press, 378 N.W.2d 875 (S.D. 1985).
27 See Anderson v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 35 N.Y.2d 746, 750–51 (1974).
20
21
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to apply with consistency.28 A dilemma arose, illustrated by two cases
from the early 1990s.29 In Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., the Southern
District of New York held that an Internet content host could totally avoid
liability for defamatory third-party content by declining to moderate any
content on its website (thereby acting as a distributor).30 In Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., a New York state trial court found
that an Internet content host acted as a publisher because it attempted to
control the content of its forums, thereby exposing itself to liability for
third-party content.31 Within this framework, Internet content hosts were
disincentivized from taking action against objectionable or illegal
content, since any effort to moderate third-party content that did not
remove all illegal content could expose a platform to the full extent of
liability.32 By contrast, Section 230’s Good Samaritan immunity
supersedes the common law publisher/distributor distinction and
incentivizes active content moderation by shielding Internet content hosts
who choose to moderate from liability resulting from illegal content that
may slip through the cracks.33
Shortly after being passed, Section 230’s indecency provisions were
gutted by the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU.34 The Court found that
the imposition of criminal sanctions for the transmission of obscene or
indecent material was overly broad and violated the First Amendment

See Section 230 Immunity, supra note 21.
See id.
30 See Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In Cubby, a
database operator brought a libel suit against one of its competitors for hosting allegedly libelous
content about the plaintiffs. Id. at 138. The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, finding that the database acted only as a distributor, not a publisher. Id. at 141.
31 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). The defendant, an online content host, ran a finance-focused
“Money Talk” forum, on which an anonymous user posted defamatory statements about the
plaintiff, an investment banking firm. Id. at *1–2. The defendant used software to screen each post
for offensive content and enforced a code of conduct for users of the platform. Id. at *10. The court
held that the defendant had acted as a publisher by exercising editorial control of the forum, and
was therefore liable for defamatory content published there by third parties. Id. at *10–14.
32 See Volokh, supra note 24 ("But whether or not those two decisions were sound under
existing legal principles, they gave service providers strong incentive not to restrict speech in their
chat rooms and other public-facing portions of their service. If they were to try to block or remove
vulgarity, pornography, or even material that they were persuaded was libelous or threatening, they
would lose their protection as distributors, and would become potentially strictly liable for material
their users posted.”).
33 See Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 63–64 (2d Cir. 2019).
34 521 U.S. 844, 874–75 (1997). The ACLU sought a declaratory judgment that the CDA
violated the First and Fifth Amendments and an injunction barring enforcement of the statute.
Affirming the injunction, the Supreme Court found that the CDA violated the First Amendment
because its provisions had a chilling effect on free speech and criminalized protected speech. Id. at
876–79. The Court did not reach the question of whether the CDA violated the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 864.
28
29

64

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

[2022

since it would include content that was constitutionally protected.35 After
Congress amended the statute, all that remained was Good Samaritan
immunity.36
B.

Section 230 in Action

Section 230 establishes two forms of immunity. The first declares
that users or providers of online platforms will not “be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.”37 This immunity is directed specifically at the First
Amendment dilemma that arose from Cubby and Stratton Oakmont.38
The second immunity is intended to promote the statute’s Internet safety
goals. It protects “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to . . . material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally
protected.”39 Together, the provisions create a statutory scheme in which
an online platform is not liable to those it censors, nor is it liable for any
failure to remove illegal or indecent content.40
Two opinions from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applying
Section 230 demonstrate both its wide reach and the potential dilemmas
that arise from such a broad immunity. First, in Doe v. GTE Corp., the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Section 230 immunity for an
Internet service provider that hosted a website selling secretly filmed
nude videos of college athletes.41 Since the objectionable content was
provided by a third party, subsection (c)(1) applied and shielded GTE
from liability “under any state-law theory to the persons harmed by [the
third party’s] material.”42
Although (c)(2) immunity was not implicated—since GTE made no
effort to remove content—the court explored in dicta the notion that

Id. at 874–75.
See Section 230 Immunity, supra note 21.
37 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
38 See FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016) (“The amendment [to
Section 230] was intended to overrule Stratton . . . .”).
39 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
40 See Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Section 230(c)(2) tackles this
problem not with a sword but with a safety net. A web host that does filter out offensive material
is not liable to the censored customer. . . . The district court held that subsection (c)(1), though
phrased as a definition rather than as an immunity, also blocks civil liability when web hosts and
other Internet service providers (ISPs) refrain from filtering or censoring the information on their
sites.”).
41 Id. at 656.
42 Id. at 659.
35
36
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Section 230 immunity might actually disincentivize “Good Samaritan”
content moderation.43 The court reasoned that, since platforms are
protected even when they do not act, there is no incentive to undertake
the costs of content moderation.44 The effect is that platforms do little to
remove indecent content while still enjoying editorial immunity—an
outcome that the court found to be inappropriate for a section of the
CDA.45
The court explored various constructions of Section 230(c) that
might bring the statute’s effect back in line with its purpose.46 One such
reading involved treating subsection (c)(1) as a definitional clause, rather
than a general immunity.47 This interpretation would treat “provider or
user” as a status (in contrast to “speaker or publisher”) that would entitle
the party to immunity under subsection (c)(2).48 However, under this
interpretation, (c)(2) immunity would effectively swallow (c)(1)
immunity and leave platforms exposed to state law liability.49 An
alternate construction, the court suggested briefly, would limit the scope
of (c)(1) immunity to “liability that depends on deeming the ISP a
‘publisher,’” like defamation.50
Ultimately, the court had no reason to conclude which interpretation
of Section 230(c) was better because the plaintiffs’ claims under the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act—that GTE had aided illegal
Id. at 660.
Id.
45 Id. (“[Section] 230(c) as a whole makes ISPs indifferent to the content of information they
host or transmit: whether they do (subsection (c)(2)) or do not (subsection (c)(1)) take precautions,
there is no liability under either state or federal law. As precautions are costly, . . . ISPs may be
expected to take the do-nothing option and enjoy immunity under § 230(c)(1). Yet § 230(c)–which
is, recall, part of the ‘Communications Decency Act’–bears the title ‘Protection for “Good
Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material,’ hardly an apt description if its principal
effect is to induce ISPs to do nothing about the distribution of indecent and offensive materials via
their services.”).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 The conclusion that Section 230, so construed, would not preempt state law claims relies on
the premise that subsection (c)(2) does not impose a duty to moderate indecent content, but only
shields those platforms who choose to do so. Id.
50 Id.; see Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended (Sept. 28, 2009).
By way of contrast, courts have found that contract claims like promissory estoppel do not implicate
Section 230 immunity because they do not require a determination of whether the defendant acted
as a publisher. See Barnes, 570 F.3d 1096. “[O]ne notices that subsection (c)(1), which after all is
captioned ‘Treatment of publisher or speaker,’ precludes liability only by means of a
definition. . . . Subsection 230(e)(3) makes explicit the relevance of this definition, for it cautions
that ‘[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local
law that is inconsistent with this section.’ Bringing these two subsections together, it appears that
subsection (c)(1) only protects from liability (1) a provider or user of an interactive computer
service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or
speaker (3) of information provided by another information content provider.” Id. at 1100–01.
43
44
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activity by “intercepting” the objectionable content51—did not require a
determination of whether GTE acted as a publisher.52 Plaintiffs also could
not show that GTE had a duty, statutory or otherwise, that would
implicate Section 230 protections.53 In a way, the court evaded the
Section 230 dilemma it identified by avoiding the question entirely.
The Seventh Circuit adopted a similarly narrow reading of
“publisher” in Chicago Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights Under the
Law v. Craigslist, Inc., in which the court upheld (c)(1) immunity for
Craigslist when it was sued over discriminatory rental housing
advertisements posted by third parties in violation of the Fair Housing
Act.54 While the court acknowledged that the advertisements were
actionable under the Fair Housing Act,55 Craigslist was nonetheless
immunized by Section 230(c)(1) because the content was provided by
third parties and it was acting in the capacity of a publisher.56
The court was careful to note that Section 230(c)(1) is not a “general
prohibition” of liability for platforms and seemed to adopt the narrow
interpretation that (c)(1) immunity is limited only to causes of action that
require a finding that the defendant acted as a publisher.57 It concluded
that the Fair Housing Act imposed liability only if Craigslist had acted as
publisher or speaker of the illegal advertisements.58 Given the protection
of Section 230(c)(1), Craigslist could not be treated as the speaker or
publisher of third-party content, so the court found no liability under the
Fair Housing Act.59

GTE, 347 F.3d at 658.
Id. at 660 (“[T]he difference matters only when some rule of state law does require ISPs to
protect third parties who may be injured by material posted on their services. Plaintiffs do not
contend that GTE ‘published’ the tapes and pictures for purposes of defamation and related theories
of liability. . . . Instead, they say, GTE is liable for ‘negligent entrustment of a chattel’ . . . .”).
53 Id. at 660–61.
54 Chi. Laws.’ Comm. for C.R. Under L., Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008),
as amended (May 2, 2008).
55 Id. at 668.
56 Id. at 671.
57 Id. at 669–71 (quoting GTE, 347 F.3d at 659–60). See also Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d
1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended (Sept. 28, 2009) (“Subsection (c)(1), by itself, shields from
liability all publication decisions, whether to edit, to remove, or to post, with respect to content
generated entirely by third parties. Subsection (c)(2), for its part, provides an additional shield from
liability, but only for ‘any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability
of material that the provider . . . considers to be obscene . . . or otherwise objectionable.” (quoting
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A))).
58 Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669–71.
59 Id. at 671.
51
52
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Applying Section 230 to Discrimination Claims

Courts have used both subsections of Section 230(c) in tandem to
find immunity for platforms being sued for removing content rather than
hosting it. For example, in Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., a religious nonprofit
sued Vimeo when the video hosting site removed content that violated its
user agreement.60 The nonprofit posted videos advocating for Sexual
Orientation Change Efforts, which were specifically prohibited by the
terms of use, and Vimeo removed the content.61 The nonprofit sued,
alleging, inter alia, religious discrimination and free speech violations
under state and federal law.62
Applying subsection (c)(1), the district court used a three-part test
for immunity that examined whether “the defendant (1) is a provider or
user of an interactive computer service, (2) the claim is based on
information provided by another information content provider, and (3)
the claim would treat the defendant as the publisher or speaker of that
information.”63 Although the plaintiffs insisted they did not seek to hold
Vimeo liable for distributing their videos, the court concluded that Vimeo
60 Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 592, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), aff’d by 991 F.3d 66 (2d
Cir. 2021), withdrawn, No. 20-616-cv, 2021 WL 4399692 (2d Cir. Sept. 23, 2021). This case has a
particularly convoluted procedural history that may raise some questions regarding its precedential
value. Plaintiffs commenced the action in the Central District of California, and defendants
succeeded in transferring to the Southern District of New York. See Domen v. Vimeo, Inc, No. 19cv-01278-SVW-AFM, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177650 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2019). Once in New
York, defendants moved to dismiss and a magistrate judge granted the motion. Vimeo, 433 F. Supp.
3d at 607–08. While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 requires that a district court review de novo
any objections to the magistrate judge’s ruling, there is no record of any such objection in the
Southern District. Instead, Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the magistrate judge’s finding of immunity for Vimeo. Vimeo, 991 F.3d at 73. A
few months later, in July 2021, the Second Circuit vacated the ruling without explanation and
granted the plaintiff’s petition for rehearing. Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 2 F.4th 1002 (2d Cir. 2021)
(mem.). Just six days after that, the Second Circuit issued a new opinion that reached the same
conclusion, but excluded any analysis of subsection (c)(1) (publisher immunity) and relied only on
subsection (c)(2) (“Good Samaritan” immunity). Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 6 F.4th 245 (2d Cir. 2021).
Finally, after vacating their order once more, the Second Circuit issued a new opinion that avoided
any analysis of Section 230 and dismissed plaintiff’s claims solely for failure to state a claim under
New York’s discrimination law. Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., No. 20-616-cv, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS
29214 (2d Cir. Sept. 23, 2021) (vacating previous opinion); Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., No. 20-616-cv,
2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 28995 (2d Cir. Sept. 24, 2021) (summary order). Although the Second
Circuit never offered any rationale for vacating its Section 230 analyses, the Vimeo saga is a salient
example of judicial uncertainty as to which type of immunity to apply and when. See Section III.D,
infra, for further discussion of overlapping immunity.
61 Id. at 599.
62 Id. at 596.
63 Id. at 601–02 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d
158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016)). The LeadClick court borrowed this test from Jane Doe No. 1 v.
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v.
Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007)).
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acted as a publisher because removing content falls in the realm of
traditional editorial functions.64 The court also found that subsection
(c)(2) applied directly to Vimeo policing content that violated its terms
of use.65 Although the plaintiffs alleged that Vimeo had not acted in good
faith, they failed to plead evidence sufficient to support that claim and the
court declined to address the question.66
Many courts are hesitant to address the meaning of “good faith”
when applying Section 230, fearing that an inquiry into the permissibility
of a platform’s motive would lead to problematic outcomes.67 Excessive
inquiry into a platform’s motive or procedure in removing content (or
not) could expose platforms to a flood of claims that would contradict the
very purpose of Section 230.68 Furthermore, the exposure of a platform’s
content moderation decision-making process to judicial review would
likely disincentivize taking any action at all, rendering Section 230
immunity meaningless.69 When faced with this choice, courts prefer to
construe subsection (c)(2) broadly, in favor of immunity.70
II. EXAMINING THE OPTIONS
A.

Legislative Proposals

Legislative proposals seeking to address problems with Section 230
were abundant during the 116th Congress.71 The following subsection
reviews two of the most common approaches to fixing Section 230, as
well as one notable proposal that goes beyond amending the text of the
statute to create an entirely new framework. My analysis of these
legislative solutions will inform the proposal I set forth below in Part IV.

Vimeo, 433 F. Supp. 3d at 602 (quoting LeadClick, 838 F.3d at 174).
Id. at 603.
66 Id. at 604.
67 See, e.g., Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 19-CV-340667, 2019 Cal. Super. LEXIS 2034,
at *27–28 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2019). The concurring opinion in Milo v. Martin defined “good
faith” simply as “an absence of malice.” 311 S.W.3d 210, 221 (Tex. App. 2010) (Gaultney, J.,
concurring).
68 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Such
close cases, we believe, must be resolved in favor of immunity, lest we cut out the heart of section
230 by forcing websites to face death by ten thousand duck-bites, fighting off claims that they
promoted or encouraged . . . the illegality of third parties.”).
69 Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., No. C-10-1321 EMC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124082, at *27–28 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 26, 2011).
70 Prager Univ., 2019 Cal. Super. LEXIS 2034, at *28 (citing Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at
1174).
71 See sources cited supra note 15.
64
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Conditional (c)(1) Immunity

Making (c)(1) immunity conditional is one of the most common
approaches to resolving the perverse incentive that platforms can benefit
from Section 230’s immunity without having to take any action to further
the statute’s goal of Internet safety.72 One Senate bill, the Stopping Big
Tech’s Censorship Act (S. 4062), makes (c)(1) immunity conditional
upon taking “reasonable steps” to prevent unlawful use of the platform.73
The bill defines “unlawful use” to include “cyberstalking, sex trafficking,
trafficking in illegal products or activities, [and] child sexual
exploitation.”74 Another, the Limiting Section 230 Immunity to Good
Samaritans Act (S. 3983), conditions immunity on the platform’s
maintenance of written terms of service.75
Whereas S. 3983’s conditional immunity is directed at ensuring
platforms’ evenhanded enforcement of their terms of use, S. 4062 attacks
the types of illegal content that Section 230 was initially intended to
address.76 By adding a requirement of active content moderation to (c)(1)
immunity, S. 4062 creates a connection between the two subsections
where before there was none—at least not explicitly.77 Both bills deal
generally with the perverse enforcement incentive by imposing a
condition on (c)(1), but they diverge in terms of policy goals. S. 4062
seeks to incentivize platforms’ pursuit of Internet safety, while S. 3893
seeks to enforce a policy of transparent terms of use and evenhanded
enforcement.78

See discussion infra Section III.C.
Stopping Big Tech’s Censorship Act, S. 4062, 116th Cong. (2020).
74 Id. § 2(1)(A)(iii).
75 Limiting Section 230 Immunity to Good Samaritans Act, S. 3983, 116th Cong. § 2(1)(A)(ii)
(2020).
76 See Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material, 47 U.S.C. § 230(b);
supra Section I.A.
77 S. 4062 § 2(1)(B)(iii). The courts in both Prager University and Vimeo at least acknowledged
that subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) are independent sources of immunity that are applied separately.
See Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 19-CV-340667, 2019 Cal. Super. LEXIS 2034, at *19–22
(Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2019); Domen v. Vimeo, 433 F. Supp. 3d 592, 601–04 (S.D.N.Y 2020),
aff’d by 6 F.4th 245 (2d Cir. 2021), withdrawn, No. 20-616-cv, 2021 WL 4399692 (2d Cir. 2021).
Both courts nevertheless applied the subsections in tandem. By treating content moderation as a
traditional editorial function, the Prager University and Vimeo courts were able to find “double
immunity” for the platforms. See Prager Univ., 2019 Cal. Super. LEXIS 2034, at *19–27; Vimeo,
433 F. Supp. 3d at 601–04. While there is no added benefit to the platform for immunity under both
(c)(1) and (c)(2), this overlapping application creates confusion as to whether (c)(1) was truly
intended to be an independent immunity. See discussion of the GTE court’s alternative readings of
Section 230 supra Section I.B.
78 See text and accompanying footnotes supra Section I.B for discussion of the perverse
incentive against moderation created by the common law publisher/distributor distinction.
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Irrespective of its policy goals, this approach faces criticism on the
grounds that it would be an unconstitutional condition imposed by the
government on a protected right.79 At least one academic proposal
suggests treating content moderation as a form of editorial discretion over
a private forum, which is protected from government interference by the
First Amendment.80 A condition on Section 230 immunity would require
platforms to give up their protected right to moderate the content of a
private forum or lose a benefit—immunity—that is necessary for their
survival.81 One scholar supports such a solution on the grounds that the
government’s interest is not compelling enough to justify inducing
platforms to give up their right to editorial discretion, and that “[s]uch
proposals should not become law.”82
While it is certain that a platform’s right to make editorial decisions
free from government interference is central to freedom of the press, the
prevailing scholarly assumption is that the First Amendment does not
require Section 230 immunity.83 This weakens the case for an
unconstitutional condition because it lessens the importance and
necessity of the benefit at issue—here, Section 230 immunity.84 If the
content moderation decisions that a platform is making would have been
protected under traditional editorial discretion doctrine, then immunity is
not necessary to protect that right and a condition on immunity would not
be unconstitutional.85
2.

Narrowing the Scope of (c)(2)

In an effort to limit platforms’ wide editorial latitude, some
lawmakers have sought to define “good faith” in subsection (c)(2) and to
narrow the scope of “objectionable” content that a platform can remove
or restrict with immunity.86 Currently, under subsection (c)(2), a platform
is protected if it acts in “good faith” to remove or restrict content that the
79 See Edwin Lee, Note, Conditioning Section 230 Immunity on Unbiased Content Moderation
Practices as an Unconstitutional Condition, 2020 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 457, 467–69 (2020).
80 See id. at 467–68.
81 Id. at 467.
82 Id. at 475.
83 See Note, Section 230 as First Amendment Rule, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2027, 2031 (2018).
84 The constitutionality of such a condition hinges on whether the benefit at issue (here, Section
230 immunity) is important and necessary to the beneficiary’s exercise of a protected right. The
more necessary the benefit is to the exercise of such a right, the more protected the benefit will be.
See Lee, supra note 79, at 467–69, and Section III.C, infra, for further discussion of
unconstitutional conditions.
85 See Lee, supra note 79, at 467–69.
86 See, e.g., Limiting Section 230 Immunity to Good Samaritans Act, S. 3983, 116th Cong.
(2020); Protect Speech Act, H.R. 8517, 116th Cong. (2020); Stop the Censorship Act, H.R. 4027,
116th Cong. (2019).
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platform believes is obscene, illegal, or “otherwise objectionable.”87 This
standard gives platforms nearly unlimited discretion to remove with
impunity whatever content it finds “objectionable,” as long as it does so
in “good faith.”88
One proposed amendment, the Protect Speech Act (H.R. 8517),
limits Good Samaritan protection to the removal of content that the
platform has an “objectively reasonable belief” is obscene, violent, or
illegal.89 This change is significant because it redirects the focus of the
analysis from the platform’s motivation in restricting the content to the
platform’s belief that the content was obscene and whether that belief was
reasonable. The bill also redefines “good faith” to include publicly
available terms of service “that state plainly and with particularity” the
platform’s content moderation policies and practices.90 It also requires
that platforms apply their terms of service evenhandedly and give users
notice describing “the reasonable factual basis” for restricting or
removing the content.91 In doing so, H.R. 8517 seeks to create more
transparency and accountability regarding content moderation.92
By requiring consistent application of the platform’s terms of
service or community guidelines, H.R. 8517 creates a First Amendment
dilemma where there already are too many.93 A consistency requirement
would force platforms to remove all the content—and only the content—
that violates terms of service or community standards, acting as a restraint
on the content a platform may moderate.94 However, these sorts of
editorial decisions are likely protected by First Amendment doctrine that
prohibits the government from requiring newspapers to maintain
politically neutral spaces.95

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
See PC Drivers Headquarters, LP v. Malwarebytes Inc., 371 F. Supp. 3d 652, 662 (N.D. Cal.
2019); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007).
89 Protect Speech Act, H.R. 8517, 116th Cong. § 2(1)(C), (2)(A) (2020).
90 Id. § 2(4)(A)–(B).
91 Id. § 2(4)(C)–(D).
92 The long form of the bill’s title reads: “To amend [S]ection 230 of the Communications Act
of 1934 to ensure that the immunity under such section incentivizes online platforms to responsibly
address illegal content while not immunizing the disparate treatment of ideological viewpoints and
continuing to encourage a vibrant, open, and competitive internet, and for other purposes.”Id. See
also id. § 2(1)(C), (2)(A), (4).
93 See Mark MacCarthy, Some Reservations About a Consistency Requirement for Social
Media Content Moderation Decisions., FORBES (July 29, 2020, 8:22 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2020/07/29/some-reservations-about-aconsistency-requirement-for-social-media-content-moderation-decisions/?sh=6b25cbda76d7 (last
visited Nov. 25, 2021). See also Section III.A, infra, for discussion of existing First Amendment
dilemmas.
94 See MacCarthy, supra note 93.
95 See discussion infra Section III.A on editorial decisions as protected speech.
87
88
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An additional pitfall of a consistency requirement is that it would
require a government agency to make determinations of whether a
platform acted appropriately in restricting content.96 That notion is
problematic because the monitoring agency, likely the Federal Trade
Commission, is probably not an expert in social media content
moderation.97 Additionally, it would be tremendously costly for a
government agency to review even a fraction of the content moderation
decisions that a social media platform makes.98
3.

A New Framework

Another groundbreaking proposal is the bipartisan Platform
Accountability and Consumer Transparency Act (PACT), which
sidesteps Section 230 in favor of a new framework.99 First, PACT
requires platforms to adopt and publish an “acceptable use policy” that
“reasonably inform[s] users about the types of content” permitted and
prohibited.100 The platform must also establish a complaint process by
which users can report objectionable content or protest the platform’s
decision to remove content.101 The bill requires platforms to submit
quarterly reports on their content moderation practices and makes
violation of these terms punishable under the Federal Trade Commission
Act.102 Additionally, PACT creates an exception to Section 230 for
platforms that have knowledge of illegal content or activity but do not
make an effort to stop the illegal use within twenty-four hours of
receiving notice.103 This requirement is not as far-reaching as it appears,
however, since proper notice of illegal content requires a court order
specifying that the content in question violates state or federal law.104
The PACT avoids many of the pitfalls that other legislative
proposals encounter, like unconstitutional conditions or limits on
platforms’ editorial decision-making, by imposing regulations on process
instead of content.105 This is also the bill’s weakness, as process
requirements like a quarterly transparency report will require a

See MacCarthy, supra note 93.
Id.
98 See infra notes 168–171 and accompanying text.
99 Platform Accountability and Consumer Transparency Act, S. 4066, 116th Cong. § 5(a)(1)–
(2)(A) (2020).
100 Id.
101 Id. § 5(a)(2)(C), (b).
102 Id. § 5(a)(2)(D), (d), (g)(2)(A).
103 Id. § 6(a).
104 Id.
105 See MacCarthy, supra note 93.
96
97
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substantial amount of agency oversight to administer.106 Scholars have
also criticized the court-ordered takedown requirement as being
susceptible to abuse by frivolous claimants.107 However, the approach of
creating narrow exceptions in Section 230 immunity—such as for content
the platform knew was illegal—is an effective step towards requiring
platforms to moderate content more actively while avoiding First
Amendment conflicts.108
B.

Executive Proposals

As discussed in the Introduction, President Trump issued an
Executive Order in May 2020 requesting administrative rulemaking to
clarify the meaning of “good faith” in subsection (c)(2).109 The Order also
suggested criteria for defining good faith, including whether the actions
are “deceptive, pretextual, or inconsistent with a provider’s terms of
service” and whether the platform provided clear notice to the user whose
content was removed.110 Shortly after the Order was issued, the Center
for Democracy and Technology (CDT) filed a lawsuit in federal court
challenging the Order as retaliatory and in violation of the First
Amendment.111 The court dismissed on the grounds that CDT failed to
demonstrate an imminent injury resulting from the Order.112 Furthermore,
the court found that CDT’s First Amendment claim was unripe for
adjudication because the Order did not prescribe law but, instead, directed
federal agencies to take actions that might eventually lead to the law CDT
claimed was unconstitutional.113
In September 2020, following President Trump’s Executive Order,
the Department of Justice (DOJ) submitted a legislative proposal based
on its own study of Section 230.114 Its conclusions, summarized in a letter
106 See infra Section III.B (discussing the risks of excessive government oversight of content
moderation).
107 See Daphne Keller, CDA 230 Reform Grows Up: The PACT Act Has Problems, But It’s
Talking About the Right Things, STAN. L. SCH. CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (July 16, 2020, 6:02
PM), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2020/07/cda-230-reform-grows-pact-act-has-problemsit%E2%80%99s-talking-about-right-things [https://perma.cc/UP2Q-VCD3]; see also MacCarthy,
supra note 93.
108 See infra Section III.C (discussing carve-outs as a less problematic alternative to conditional
immunity).
109 See supra Introduction; Exec. Order No. 13,925, supra note 5.
110 Exec. Order No. 13,925, supra note 5, at 34,081.
111 Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Trump, 507 F. Supp. 3d 213 (D.D.C. 2020).
112 Id. at 227–28.
113 Id.
114 Letter from William P. Barr, U.S. Att’y Gen., to Michael R. Pence, Vice President of the
U.S. (Sept. 23, 2020) [hereinafter DOJ Letter], https://www.justice.gov/file/1319346/download
[https://perma.cc/2CSD-YSGB].
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sent to Congress, identify many of the same changes proposed by the bills
discussed above, including defining “good faith”115 and narrowing the
content that can be removed with immunity under subsection (c)(2).116 It
also conditions subsection (c)(1) immunity on “act[ing] in good faith and
abid[ing] by [a platform’s] own terms of service and public
representations.”117
However, the DOJ’s recommendations expand on the congressional
proposals in several key respects. First, the letter seeks to “clarif[y] the
interplay” between subsection (c)(1) and subsection (c)(2) immunity and
finds “that platforms cannot use [Section] 230(c)(1) as a shield against
moderation decisions that fall outside the explicit limitations of [Section]
230(c)(2).”118 This change is directed specifically at cases like Vimeo,
where courts use subsection (c)(1) to immunize a platform that removes
content by construing “publisher” to include editorial decisions.119
Implicit in this recommendation is the notion that subsection (c)(1) is
intended to apply when a platform does not remove content and
subsection (c)(2) applies when a platform does.120
The DOJ deepened the divide between subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2)
by also recommending an amendment to subsection (c)(1) to clarify that
a content moderation decision, made in good faith and consistent with a
platform’s terms of service, does not automatically make that platform a
publisher.121 This amendment serves to reinforce the belief that
subsection (c)(1) and subsection (c)(2) immunity should not overlap—
that a platform should not be protected under subsection (c)(1) for
restricting or removing content that would not otherwise be subject to
subsection (c)(2) immunity.122 In effect, application of subsection (c)(1)
immunity would be limited to liability that required a determination of
whether the platform published—or merely distributed—the offending
third-party content.123
115 Interestingly, both the DOJ and H.R. 8517 propose identical statutory definitions of “good
faith.” Compare id. at 2, with H.R. 8517, 116th Cong. § 2(4)(A)–(D) (2020) (proposing a statutory
definition that would require “publicly available terms of service or use that state plainly and with
particularity the criteria the interactive computer service employs in content-moderation practices,”
as well as timely notice to the creators of content that has been restricted providing a “factual basis
for the restriction” and an opportunity to respond).
116 DOJ Letter, supra note 114, at 2–3.
117 Id. at 3.
118 Id. at 2.
119 See Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 592, 601–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), aff’d by 6 F.4th
245 (2d Cir. 2021), withdrawn, No. 20-616-cv, 2021 WL 4399692 (2d Cir. 2021).
120 See Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003).
121 DOJ Letter, supra note 114, at 3.
122 Id.
123 See notes 54–59 and accompanying text for discussion of a case, Chi. Laws.’ Comm. for
C.R. Under L., Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008), as amended (May 2, 2008), in
which the plaintiff’s claims required a finding that the defendant platform acted as publisher.
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Lastly, the DOJ proposal also includes three new exceptions to
(c)(2) immunity for “platforms that (1) purposefully promote, facilitate,
or solicit third-party content that would violate federal criminal law; (2)
have actual knowledge that specific content it is hosting violates federal
law; and (3) fail to remove unlawful content after receiving notice by way
of a final court judgment.”124 These exceptions are intended to further
Section 230’s original purpose of promoting Internet safety by creating
“carve-outs” in (c)(2) immunity for platforms that fail to take appropriate
action.125
III. STRUCTURING A PROPOSAL
Before proceeding to a proposal, it is necessary to lay out some legal
and practical guard rails in order to structure a proposal that achieves the
purposes of the CDA—free speech and a safer Internet—while steering
clear of constitutional pitfalls.126 This Part lays out five factors that are
key to formulating the proposal that follows in Part IV. These factors are
distilled from court decisions,127 legislative and executive proposals,128
and scholarship,129 and represent obstacles that have arisen in seeking to
amend Section 230: the First Amendment, the mode of implementation,
conditions on immunity, “overlapping” immunity, and defining “good
faith.” These considerations will serve both as limits and as objectives for
a proposal that seeks to promote the original purposes of Section 230
while navigating the litany of pitfalls that accompany government
regulation of online content moderation.130

DOJ Letter, supra note 114, at 3.
Id. at 3–4.
126 47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
127 See supra Sections I.B–C for discussion of courts’ varying approaches to applying Section
230 and their conflicting interpretations of immunity under subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2).
128 See supra Part II for discussion of various governmental approaches to amending Section
230 and the common themes and obstacles they encounter.
129 See supra Section II.A.1 and infra Section III.A for scholarly discussion of constitutional
issues that arise from government regulation of content moderation. See infra Sections III.B–C for
discussion of competing scholarly approaches to regulation.
130 The primary purposes of Section 230, codified in 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) and referenced
throughout this Note, are to promote a free marketplace of ideas and to minimize illegal or unsafe
content online. The constitutional question—to what extent the government may require platforms
to promote those ends—is discussed briefly at supra Section II.A.1, and in greater detail at infra
Section III.A.
124
125
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Preliminary First Amendment Considerations

Any attempt at regulating platforms’ content moderation practices
risks First Amendment challenges on the grounds that the platforms’ acts
of content moderation—often carried out by algorithms—are themselves
a form of protected speech.131 Professor Kyle Langvardt suggests that
social media platforms would frame content moderation as an editorial
decision akin to the editorial discretion often exercised by a newspaper.132
Social media platforms likely “occupy the high ground” with this
argument, Langvardt asserts, since the First Amendment as applied to
newspapers has protected editorial decisions from government
interference.133 This even prohibits requirements that newspapers
maintain a politically balanced op-ed space.134 In short, the government
likely could not require social media platforms to moderate content in a
politically neutral manner.
This challenge is compounded by the premise that online platforms
are private companies and not state actors or common carriers, so they
are not bound by traditional First Amendment requirements, like
viewpoint neutrality.135 Although private entities, state actors are agents
of the government and, consequently, are bound by the same First
Amendment limits as the government itself.136 To be considered a state
actor, an entity must either “perform[] a traditional, exclusive public
function,” or act in conjunction with, or under the compulsion of, the
state.137 Few, if any, social media platforms would meet these criteria.138
131 See Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1364–65
(2018).
132 See id. at 1365.
133 Id. at 1364.
134 See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257–58 (1974).
135 See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928–30 (2019) (“[T]he
[First Amendment] prohibits only governmental abridgment of speech. . . . [A] private entity who
provides a forum for speech is not transformed by that fact alone into a state actor.”).
136 See id.
137 See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357–59 (1974); Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at
1928.
138 See Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921 at 1928 (“[A] private entity can qualify as a state actor in a few
limited circumstances—including, for example, (i) when the entity performs a traditional, exclusive
public function; (ii) when the government compels the private entity to take a particular action; or
(iii) when the government acts jointly with the private entity.” (internal citations omitted)). Of the
many roles that social media plays in our world, it appears that none exercises a power “traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State,” the most common of which is elections. Id. at 1928–29 (quoting
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352). Even functions that are apparently for the “public good,” including
supplying energy or running a nursing home, do not qualify as government functions for the
purposes of determining whether a private entity is a state actor. Id. Recently, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the hosting of speech on a private platform does not qualify as a traditional and
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A related argument is that social media constitutes a public forum, the
access to which is protected by the First Amendment.139 However, public
forum doctrine is more relevant to situations when government officials
block users from their own social media profiles, since the doctrine
applies only to situations in which the government limits access to the
forum.140
Taking these constitutional considerations together, it becomes clear
that any government regulation of online content moderation practices
will operate within narrow boundaries. Langvardt reminds that these
constraints are not permanent, but subject to change based on the
doctrinal inclinations of the Supreme Court.141 Nevertheless, the current
situation makes clear that online platforms should be—and must be—
regulated with a subtle hand to avoid running into constitutional
challenges.
In February 2021, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis proposed more
aggressive legislation that would impose a fine of $100,000 on social
media platforms that ban the accounts of political candidates.142 Although
the bill was approved by the Florida legislature, a federal court issued an
injunction blocking the law from taking effect on the grounds that the
First Amendment protects social media platforms against being forced to
host political content.143 In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, a
newspaper challenged a regulation requiring it to give politicians a “right
of reply” when criticized in editorials.144 The Supreme Court held that
mandating the publication of a reply article interfered with the

exclusive government function. See Prager Univ. v. Google, LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 997–98 (9th Cir.
2020).
139 See Samantha Briggs, Note, The Freedom of Tweets: The Intersection of Government Use of
Social Media and Public Forum Doctrine, 52 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 5–7 (2018).
140 See id. at 5–6, 14–16.
141 Langvardt, supra note 131, at 1366 (“Those trends, of course, can change. Certain broad
doctrinal contours that appear timeless today in fact developed relatively recently and are
surprisingly contingent on the [Supreme] Court’s partisan fault line.”).
142 Florida Gov. DeSantis Proposing Laws Against ‘Censorship’ by Social Media Companies,
NBC MIAMI (Feb. 2, 2021, 3:42 PM), https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/florida-govdesantis-holding-news-conference-in-tallahassee/2372711 [https://perma.cc/MS5N-AD8Q].
143 Sara Morrison, Florida’s Social Media Free Speech Law Has Been Blocked for Likely
Violating Free Speech Laws, VOX (July 1, 2021, 2:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2021/7/
1/22558980/florida-social-media-law-injunction-desantis [https://perma.cc/QD7W-7WXS]; see
also NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 21cv220-RH-MAF, 2021 WL 2690876 (N.D. Fla. June 30,
2021) (granting preliminary injunction blocking the Florida law); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Judd Legum, DeSantis, Big Tech, and the Future of Trumpism,
POPULAR INFO. (Feb. 4, 2021), https://popular.info/p/desantis-big-tech-and-the-future?
r=a5hc&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&utm_source=copy [https://perma.cc/8FVNMAUD].
144 See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. 241.
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newspaper’s protected right to choose the content it publishes.145 With
respect to the 2021 Florida law, the district court held that requiring social
media platforms to host political candidates’ content is the twenty-first
century equivalent of requiring a politically neutral op-ed page.146
B.

Why the Only Solution Is a Government Solution

Given the narrow First Amendment limits, it might appear that
legislation is not the best approach to resolving the Section 230 dilemma.
Surveying three alternate legal approaches—common law, federal
administrative regulation, and state-level regulation—Langvardt
concludes not only that federal legislation is appropriate, but that
Congress is the only branch of government with the authority to restrict
content moderation by private entities.147 He first argues that a common
law solution is untenable because it would require courts to loosen the
state action doctrine when applied to private speech in order to hold
platforms accountable to First Amendment requirements.148 Langvardt
also dismisses administrative rulemaking that might reclassify social
media platforms as common carriers—and therefore subject to content
regulation—on the grounds that they cannot be analogized easily to
services like the telephone or broadband Internet.149 Finally, any statelevel attempts to “punish overzealous content moderation” would likely
face federal preemption and challenges under the dormant commerce
clause of the Constitution.150
Langvardt maintains that government intervention is especially
desirable because there are few alternative platforms available for users
trying to escape overly restrictive moderation.151 Although modern
technology gives the appearance of a nearly infinite realm of possibility,
the reality in social media is that the vast majority of speech happens on
145 See id. at 258 (“A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment,
and advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to
limitations on the size and the content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public
officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has
yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised
consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.”).
146 See NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876 (granting preliminary injunction).
147 See Langvardt, supra note 131, at 1366–67.
148 Id. at 1366 (“Such a transformation in the law is not completely unthinkable, but it is nearly
so . . . .”).
149 Id. at 1368–69. In an act of political clairvoyance, Langvardt anticipated that a president
might try to bypass Congress by resorting to executive agencies. This is more or less what President
Trump did with his May 2020 Executive Order. See Exec. Order No. 13,925, supra note 5, at
34,080.
150 Langvardt, supra note 131, at 1370.
151 Id. at 1371.
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a small group of social networks, owned by an even smaller group of tech
conglomerates.152 Out of approximately 3.5 billion social media users
worldwide, Facebook commands more than 2.3 billion monthly active
users (MAU).153 In second place is YouTube, owned by Google, with
nearly 2 billion MAU.154 Instagram, also owned by Facebook, has about
1 billion MAU.155 In short, more than two-thirds of all social media users
in the world use a single platform, Facebook, which also owns the thirdmost popular platform.156 Twitter, not owned by Facebook or Google,
pales in comparison with a measly 330 million MAU.157
To further illustrate the lack of meaningful competition in social
media, consider the rash of social media bans against President Trump
following his supporters’ riot at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.158
Twitter permanently banned Trump on January 8, claiming that Trump
had violated the platform’s policy against threatening or glorifying
violence.159 Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Snapchat, and others also
banned Trump for various lengths of time.160 Additionally, Google,
Amazon, and Apple banned Twitter alternative Parler from their app
stores on the grounds that the platform was used extensively to promote

152 See Mozilla, Social Media Giants Facebook, Tencent, Google Reign, INTERNET HEALTH
REP. (Apr. 2018), https://internethealthreport.org/2018/social-media-giants-facebook-tencentgoogle-reign [https://perma.cc/ZA8T-EV98].
153 Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, The Rise of Social Media, OUR WORLD IN DATA (Sept. 18, 2019),
https://ourworldindata.org/rise-of-social-media [https://perma.cc/THX4-2QWE].
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See Mozilla, supra note 152.
157 Ortiz-Ospina, supra note 153.
158 Dan Barry, Mike McIntire & Matthew Rosenberg, ‘Our President Wants Us Here’: The Mob
That Stormed the Capitol, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/
capitol-rioters.html [https://perma.cc/2EN6-8L3L].
159 The offending tweet read: “The 75,000,000 great American Patriots who voted for me,
AMERICA FIRST, and MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN, will have a GIANT VOICE long
into the future. They will not be disrespected or treated unfairly in any way, shape or form!!!”
Twitter, Inc., Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER BLOG (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.html
[https://perma.cc/QL6SWE7L]; see also Glorification of Violence Policy, TWITTER (Mar. 2019), https://help.twitter.com/
en/rules-and-policies/glorification-of-violence [https://perma.cc/5PWT-UZTJ] (prohibiting users
from “glorifying, praising, condoning, or celebrating . . . attacks carried out by terrorist
organizations or violent extremist groups”).
160 See Sara Fischer & Ashley Gold, All the Platforms That Have Banned or Restricted Trump
so Far, AXIOS (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.axios.com/platforms-social-media-ban-restrict-trumpd9e44f3c-8366-4ba9-a8a1-7f3114f920f1.html [https://perma.cc/4P93-N8AY]; Hannah Denham,
These Are the Platforms That Have Banned Trump and His Allies, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2021,
6:11 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/11/trump-banned-social-media
[https://perma.cc/ELR4-A9HM].
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the Capitol riots and other violence.161 Parler is a particular favorite
amongst Trump supporters and other right-wing social media users
because its content moderation policies are held out as being more
permissive than mainstream platforms’policies.162
The case of Trump’s mass de-platforming demonstrates that
widespread collective action against a common persona non grata can
result in the exclusion of that person (or groups) from the market for
social media.163 Additionally, by banning Parler, Google, Amazon, and
Apple also removed the primary alternative to “Big Social Media,”
narrowing the market and raising barriers to entry for those alternatives
that might try to compete.164 This illustration of the lack of alternatives to
Big Social Media serves to identify the risk that voluntary measures may
be ineffective due to the lack of meaningful competition amongst social
media platforms and to underscore the necessity of a legislative solution.
By way of comparison, Professor Edward Lee recently put forward
a proposal that advocates for a voluntary, uniform code of nonpartisan
content moderation.165 Finding that most platforms’ policies already
embrace varying degrees of nonpartisanship, Lee suggests expanding the
existing framework to include a standardized protocol for reviewing and
appealing platforms’ editorial decisions.166 This system would also utilize
trained moderators to review content, transparency reports that include
data about the platform’s moderation activity, and independent audits to
provide expert feedback.167
Langvardt and Lee agree that a major downside to an extensive
government regulatory scheme is that it would require substantial—
161 See Fischer, supra note 160; Bryan Sullivan, Amazon and Twitter “Deplatforming” Parler
and Trump; Is It Legal?, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2021, 6:28 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
legalentertainment/2021/01/28/amazon-and-twitter-deplatforming-parler-and-trump-is-it-legal/?
sh=21958acf7d25 [https://perma.cc/B5W5-CNY7].
162 See Tunku Varadarajan, The ‘Common-Carrier’ Solution to Social-Media Censorship,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2021, 12:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-common-carriersolution-to-social-media-censorship-11610732343
[https://perma.cc/HC2F-RFTZ];
Mike
Masnick, Parler Speedruns the Content Moderation Learning Curve; Goes From ‘We Allow
Everything’ to ‘We’re the Good Censors’ in Days, TECHDIRT (July 1, 2020, 10:43 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20200630/23525844821/parler-speedruns-content-moderationlearning-curve-goes-we-allow-everything-to-were-good-censors-days.shtml
[https://perma.cc/
Y7H4-7SLF].
163 See supra notes 151–162 and accompanying text.
164 See Varadarajan, supra note 162. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Professor
Richard Epstein of New York University School of Law argued that iPhones make up 40% of the
market for smartphones, so removing Parler’s access to the Apple App Store effectively removes
40% of Parler’s potential users. Id. Professor Epstein noted that Gab, another social media
alternative, is in the process of performing an end-run around Apple’s restrictions by developing
its own independent server network and becoming completely “self-sufficient.” Id.
165 Lee, supra note 12, at 925–26.
166 Id. at 1039–44.
167 Id. at 1044–50.
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almost excessive—agency interference in platforms’ day-to-day
operations.168 One example of such a proposal is Senator Josh Hawley’s
Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, which requires the Federal
Trade Commission to establish a process by which it certifies that
platforms do not engage in politically biased content moderation, thereby
entitling them to Section 230 immunity.169 Not only would it require
substantial resources for the Federal Trade Commission to review the
content moderation activity of every online platform seeking
immunity,170 but it would also create an “immensely important quasiconstitutional institution” with broad-reaching, undefined powers.171
A strength of Lee’s proposal is that it avoids the issue of government
overreach or intrusion that might result from too aggressive a regulatory
scheme.172 The flipside of such a voluntary code is that it relies on the
goodwill of quasi-monopolies to undertake the costs of adopting and
implementing the code, including the three-level, double-blind review
process Lee proposes.173
C.

“Something for Nothing”

Platforms’ ability to immunize themselves entirely from liability
without having to make any effort to advance the purposes of Section 230
has created a “something for nothing” dilemma, in which platforms enjoy
the benefits of immunity without having to screen for illegal content.174
In a way, the dilemma encompasses both parties’ gripes with Section 230.
On one hand, platforms may moderate content however they see fit,
leading to claims of viewpoint discrimination and anti-conservative bias
on the right.175 On the other, platforms are protected by Section 230
168 Compare Langvardt, supra note 131, at 1363 (“[T]his model would require a degree of
administrative hassle and governmental intrusion that lacks precedent in the law of free speech.”),
with Lee, supra note 12, at 1036 (“Some of the proposed Section 230 bills would entangle the
[Federal Trade Commission] or courts in thorny determinations of whether an internet platform
engaged in content moderation in a ‘politically biased manner,’ beyond ‘unlawful material,’ not ‘in
a viewpoint-neutral manner,’ or not justified by ‘a compelling reason for restricting that access or
availability.’”).
169 Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019).
170 See Lee, supra note 12, at 1055–56.
171 Langvardt, supra note 131, at 1378.
172 See Lee, supra note 12, at 1036.
173 Id. at 1046–50.
174 See supra Section I.B.
175 It is worth recognizing here that multiple recent studies tend to disprove the right’s claim
that social media is biased against them. In October 2020, Politico found that conservatives
dominated online conversations on hot topics leading up to the election. See Mark Scott, Despite
Cries of Censorship, Conservatives Dominate Social Media, POLITICO (Oct. 27, 2020, 1:38 PM),

82

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

[2022

regardless of whether they undertake to remove indecent or illegal
content—one of the left’s major complaints.176
The most common solution put forward to deal with the “something
for nothing” dilemma is to impose a condition on (c)(1) immunity: either
to moderate content in a nonpartisan manner or to engage in proactive
moderation of indecent and illegal content.177 Although such conditions
are admittedly a direct route to holding platforms accountable for Section
230’s various policy objectives, they are also vulnerable to constitutional
challenges on the grounds that they impermissibly restrict platforms’ free
exercise of their First Amendment right to monitor content on a private
forum.178
A solution that avoids the constitutional issue while still addressing
the dilemma might be to create carve-outs to immunity based on certain
behaviors that both sides agree are harmful.179 Some examples of such
carveouts are the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) and the Stop
Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA), a pair of anti-sex trafficking bills
passed in tandem in 2018 that remove Section 230 immunity if third
parties use a platform to advertise or solicit sex work. 180 Detractors of
FOSTA-SESTA argue that it imposes a costly burden of moderation on
platforms and punishes them based on the unpredictable behavior of their
users.181 Other classes of carve-outs might include exceptions to
immunity for platforms that host content created by certain specified
terrorist organizations or platforms that do not limit foreign
propaganda.182
A final consideration when implementing the carve-out solution to
the “something for nothing” dilemma is that it is better directed at the

https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/26/censorship-conservatives-social-media-432643
[https://perma.cc/V6R9-KKKX]. The New York University Center for Business and Human Rights
also released a study in February 2021 that further disproves claims of bias using publicly available
social media engagement data. See generally PAUL M. BARRETT & J. GRANT SIMS, FALSE
ACCUSATION: THE UNFOUNDED CLAIM THAT SOCIAL MEDIA COMPANIES CENSOR
CONSERVATIVES
14–17
(2021),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
5b6df958f8370af3217d4178/t/60187b5f45762e708708c8e9/1612217185240/
NYU+False+Accusation_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR2E-U52A].
176 See supra Section I.B.
177 Compare Limiting Section 230 Immunity to Good Samaritans Act, S. 3983, 116th Cong.
(2020) (conditioning immunity on nonpartisan moderation), with Stopping Big Tech’s Censorship
Act, S. 4062, 116th Cong. (2020) (conditioning immunity on affirmative moderation of illegal
content).
178 See supra Section II.A.1.
179 See Lee, supra note 79, at 477–78.
180 See Aja Romano, A New Law Intended to Curb Sex Trafficking Threatens the Future of the
Internet as We Know It, VOX (July 2, 2018, 1:08 PM), https://www.vox.com/culture/2018/4/13/
17172762/fosta-sesta-backpage-230-internet-freedom [https://perma.cc/C549-G8NN].
181 See id.
182 See Lee, supra note 79, at 477–78.
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goal of preventing illegal uses of platforms than of preventing politicallybiased moderation.183 Government regulation of speech based on its
content (as compared to regulations regarding its “time, place, and
manner”) must survive a stricter degree of judicial review that looks to
whether the regulation is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest.”184 In fact, Section 230 itself is the sole remnant of
an encounter with strict scrutiny: the rest of the CDA was ruled an overly
vague content-based regulation.185 Since it is well-settled that the
government cannot require the publication of politically neutral content,
any carve-out that would limit a platform’s editorial discretion—
particularly with respect to political content—already has the weight of
authority against it and would not likely pass constitutional muster.186 By
contrast, Section 230 already contains several carve-outs for the
enforcement of state and federal laws, including intellectual property,
communications privacy, and sex trafficking laws.187
D.

Separating the Overlapping Immunities

As illustrated by some of the leading opinions dealing with Section
230 immunity, there is an apparent overlap in the way that courts apply
subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2), especially to claims of discriminatory
content moderation.188 Although (c)(1) is commonly recognized as the
subsection to protect platforms against speaker or publisher liability for
third-party content, courts frequently read “publisher” in (c)(1) to include
any actions the platform took that would constitute editorial decisions.189
183 Restrictions on speech for the purpose of preventing illegal conduct generally stand up better
to judicial scrutiny than do regulations dealing with the content of speech. Accord Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997) (invalidating as overbroad most of the CDA provisions banning
“indecent” material while preserving those relating to illegal uses of the Internet); Miami Herald
Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that a local law requiring a newspaper to
maintain a politically neutral op-ed page was an unconstitutional restriction on the content of
protected speech).
184 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009).
185 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 871–74.
186 See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. 241; supra Section III.A (discussing the Miami Herald
decision).
187 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)–(5).
188 See, e.g., Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 19-CV-340667, 2019 Cal. Super. LEXIS 2034
(Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2019); Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), aff’d
by 6 F.4th 245 (2d Cir. 2021), withdrawn, No. 20-616-cv, 2021 WL 4399692 (2d Cir. 2021). See
also Sections I.B–C, supra, for discussion of the dilemmas that arise from the interaction of (c)(1)
and (c)(2) immunity, especially when courts find immunity under both subsections (as in Prager
University and Vimeo, Inc.).
189 See, e.g., Vimeo, 433 F. Supp. 3d at 602; FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 174
(2d Cir. 2016); In re Zoom Video Commc’ns Priv. Litig., 525 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1032 (N.D. Cal.
2021).
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By including content moderation as a form of editorial decision,
platforms could theoretically be immunized under (c)(1) even if their
action was not in “good faith” or not directed at a type of objectionable
content specified in (c)(2).190
Overlapping immunity strays from one of the original intentions of
Section 230, which was to resolve the “moderator’s dilemma” that arose
from the Cubby and Stratton Oakmont decisions.191 A prevailing judicial
interpretation of Section 230 is that subsection (c)(2) protects the
platform when it chooses to remove content—addressing Stratton
Oakmont—and (c)(1) protects the platform when it refrains from
moderating, as in Cubby.192 Allowing (c)(1) immunity for acts of content
moderation destroys the difference between the two subsections and
grants immunity with an overly broad stroke.193 The DOJ
recommendations deal with this overlap most directly, decoupling the
two subsections with a term specifying that the removal of content
pursuant to subsection (c)(2) does not necessarily make the platform a
publisher of all other third-party content.194 This term would consolidate
immunity for content removal under (c)(2) by excluding moderation
decisions from the scope of (c)(1) immunity.195
To effectively separate the two immunities, however, a proposal
must also narrow the scope of “otherwise objectionable” content in
(c)(2).196 Courts have read this phrase broadly, granting essentially
unlimited discretion to platforms to remove content as they see fit.197 This
change can be accomplished simply, by removing “otherwise
190 See supra Section III.B, infra Section III.D, for discussion of content moderation as an
editorial function protected by the First Amendment.
191 See supra Section I.A.
192 See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.,
129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997). Compare Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that a platform could avoid liability by refusing to moderate content,
thereby acting as a distributor), with Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94,
1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (holding that a platform that exercises
any editorial control acts as a publisher and is liable for third-party content).
193 See discussion of the GTE court’s alternative readings of Section 230, supra Section I.B.
194 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SECTION 230—NURTURING INNOVATION OR FOSTERING
UNACCOUNTABILITY? KEY TAKEAWAYS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4, 21–22 (2020) [hereinafter
DOJ RECOMMENDATIONS], available for download at https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/
department-justice-s-review-section-230-communications-decency-act-1996
[https://perma.cc/
B3RW-SBKA].
195 Id. at 22 (“A takedown decision pursuant to (c)(2)(A) is immune from civil liability under
Section 230. A platform’s removal or restriction of content outside of (c)(2)(A) is not entitled to
Section 230 immunity—under either (c)(1) or (c)(2)—even if consistent with the platform’s terms
of service.”).
196 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
197 See, e.g., PC Drivers Headquarters, LP v. Malwarebytes Inc., 371 F. Supp. 3d 652, 662 (N.D.
Cal. 2019); Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009); Zeran, 129 F.3d
327.
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objectionable” and replacing it with more specific qualifications of the
content a platform can remove with immunity.198 The question of how
tightly to narrow the scope of (c)(2) is a policy decision, but the essence
of the revision is that the determination of “objectionable” should not be
left to the platform’s discretion.199
E.

Defining “Good Faith”

The issue of defining “good faith” has been a perennial issue both
for courts applying Section 230 and for lawmakers trying to amend the
statute.200 A primary concern is that the good faith standard is often
ignored, and that platforms censor those who express politically
unpopular viewpoints.201 Many proposals seek to define “good faith” in
terms of a platform’s evenhanded, transparent, and politically neutral
enforcement of its terms of service.202 As a favorable example, the DOJ
recommendations provide a detailed, four-point framework for assessing
whether a platform has acted in good faith.203 A strength of this
framework is that it avoids constitutional issues by only regulating the
manner of enforcement, not what kind of content the platform may
remove.204
One area of concern, however, is the recommendation that a good
faith content removal requires an objectively reasonable belief that the
content falls within one of the categories specified by (c)(2)(A).205 This
recommendation introduces a reasonable person standard into the good
198 Legislative proposals that approximate this approach include: S. 3983, 116th Cong. (2020);
S. 4828, 116th Cong. (2020); S. 4534, 116th Cong. (2020); and H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2019).
199 DOJ RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 194, at 21 (“Unconstrained discretion is particularly
concerning in the hands of the biggest platforms, which today effectively own and operate digital
public squares. . . . The vagueness of the term ‘otherwise objectionable’ risks giving every platform
a free pass for removing any and all speech that it dislikes, without any potential for recourse by
the user.”).
200 See discussion of courts avoiding the question of “good faith,” supra Section I.C.
201 See DOJ RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 194, at 22; see also Reardon, supra note 13.
202 See, e.g., DOJ RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 194, at 22; S. 3983, 116th Cong. (2020); S.
4828, 116th Cong. (2020).
203 DOJ RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 194, at 22 (“To restrict access to particular content in
‘good faith,’ a platform should be required to meet four criteria. First, it must have publicly
available terms of service or use that state plainly and with particularity the criteria the platform
will employ in its content-moderation practices. Second, any restrictions of access must be
consistent with those terms of service or use and with any official representations regarding the
platform’s content-moderation policies. Third, any restrictions of access must be based on an
objectively reasonable belief that the content falls within one of the categories set forth in
subsection (c)(2)(A). And fourth, the platform must supply the provider of the content with a timely
notice explaining with particularity the factual basis for the restriction of access . . . .”).
204 See supra Section III.A for a discussion of First Amendment limitations.
205 See DOJ RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 194, at 22.

86

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

[2022

faith analysis in order to promote greater neutrality and transparency in
moderation decisions.206 However, the language proposed by the DOJ
seems to focus more on the platform’s belief—and whether it was
objectively reasonable—than whether the content removed could
reasonably be understood to violate the terms of use. Furthermore, courts
fear that excessive inquiry into a platform’s motive or belief while
removing content may lead to problematic or unconstitutional
outcomes.207 Perhaps a simple solution to this concern is to remove this
requirement entirely, since it appears redundant of several of the DOJ’s
recommended good faith factors.208
As a supplement to its definition of good faith, the DOJ also
recommends creating a carve-out in (c)(2) immunity for “Bad
Samaritans” who promote or facilitate illegal content while still enjoying
Section 230 immunity.209 Given the constitutional concerns addressed
above, the creation of carve-outs in the blanket immunity is a favorable
approach because it allows for narrow exceptions that do not tread on
platforms’ editorial discretion.210
IV. PROPOSAL: “PACT PLUS”
Of all the government solutions set forth in Part II, the bill that fits
best within the guiderails is PACT. Its primary strength is that it avoids
First Amendment concerns about infringing on platforms’ editorial
decisions by regulating process, rather than content.211 Additionally, it
uses narrow carve-outs to remove Section 230 immunity from platforms
that do not police illegal content—an effective means of sidestepping
concerns about unconstitutional conditions.212 As the need for new
exceptions to immunity arises, legislators can add narrow carve-outs to
address the need while being careful to avoid constitutional issues.213
That said, PACT has its weaknesses, including a need for excessive
agency oversight and the potential for abuse by frivolous claimants.214
There are also serious questions about whether the transparency reports

Id.
See, e.g., Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 19-CV-340667, 2019 Cal. Super. LEXIS 2034
(Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2019); Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174
(9th Cir. 2008).
208 See DOJ RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 194, at 22.
209 Id. at 14.
210 See supra Section III.D.
211 See supra Section II.A.3; MacCarthy, supra note 93.
212 See supra Section III.C.
213 See Lee, supra note 79, at 477–78.
214 See Keller, supra note 107.
206
207
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required by the bill will be useful in monitoring platforms’ content
moderation practices.215
While agency oversight presents practical and constitutional pitfalls,
it is a necessary evil that can be limited through specific constraints on
the agency’s power to review platforms’ content moderation decisions.216
Ideally, the agency’s review would not ask whether the content at issue
indeed violated the platform’s community standards, but whether the
platform acted in accordance with its published terms of use. Although
this opens the door for platforms to adopt and publish a rule of essentially
unlimited power to remove content, users could discover this through
transparency reports (or by simply reading the platform’s terms of use)
and choose to use an alternative platform.217
PACT maintains Section 230 immunity in parallel with its new
framework, so it is necessary to include changes to that immunity in order
to achieve fully the legislation’s goals.218 A “PACT Plus” proposal
should—and does—include carve-outs to limit (c)(1) immunity.219 These
carve-outs are essential to ensure that restrictions on content moderation
are not so broad as to be unconstitutional.220 An effective proposal must
also separate the “overlap” of subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) so that content
moderation decisions are not immunized under both.221 This can be
accomplished first by specifying that content removals pursuant to (c)(2)
do not, on their own, render a platform a publisher under (c)(1).222 Then,
a proposal should narrow the scope of (c)(2) protection by removing the
“otherwise objectionable” language that gives platforms nearly unlimited
discretion to remove content.223
Finally, a proposal must define “good faith” with a set of clear
criteria to aid courts in assessing the nature of platforms’ actions in
Id.
See MacCarthy, supra note 93 (“Agency oversight still seems necessary for the effective
operation of any due process requirement for platform content moderation. It is needed to put teeth
in even the basic requirement that social media companies publish the content rules that govern
their content moderation decisions.”).
217 See id. (“Abandoning a consistency requirement and limiting agency enforcement creates its
own difficulties. . . . [I]t seems a company could just put out whatever rules it wants and then act
in accordance with them or not as it sees fit in specific cases. It could even say in its rules that it
reserves the right to take down any content for any reason whatsoever, thereby allowing itself to
engage in essentially arbitrary, unreasoned content moderation decision making. The transparency
reports would let the public know about these abuses but would not themselves force any changes
in platform conduct.”); see also supra Section III.B for a counterpoint about the limited and
shrinking market for social media.
218 See supra Section II.A.3.
219 See supra Section III.C.
220 See supra Section III.A.
221 See supra Sections III.C–III.D.
222 See DOJ RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 194.
223 See supra Section II.A.2.
215
216
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removing content.224 The DOJ recommendations also set forth a
particularly useful four-part test for good faith that seems to avoid
constitutional issues by looking primarily at the platform’s application of
its terms of use.225 By tying the definition of good faith to the way a
platform enforces and adheres to its terms of use, the DOJ’s test helps
reinforce the PACT transparency framework.226 In effect, platforms’
immunity to remove content will be tied to their adherence with their own
terms of use.
CONCLUSION
In the leadup to his inauguration in January 2021, President Joe
Biden resumed calls for lawmakers to repeal Section 230 entirely, citing
overreach and propagation of false information by Facebook and other
social media platforms.227 Although President Biden’s approach is
contrary to those put forward by lawmakers and Trump’s administration,
it shares a common motivation: to restrict platforms’ unlimited immunity
to remove content on a whim.228 The 116th Congress produced a wealth
of options for reforming Section 230 that fall short of repealing the statute
entirely, and the Biden Administration would do well to take them under
consideration.229 One standout option, PACT, leaves Section 230
immunity in place, albeit with an exception for failure to comply with a
court order, and builds a new framework dedicated to content moderation
transparency.230 PACT nimbly avoids constitutional issues by requiring
due process in content moderation instead of regulating what platforms
can and cannot moderate.231 However, the bill should be amended to
include certain key changes to the text of Section 230 that will make a
considerable impact in reining in the nearly unlimited immunity to
moderate content that platforms currently enjoy.232 Between these two
strategies—process requirements and more limited immunity—the
Congress can restrict platforms’ wide reach while still accomplishing the
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original goals of Section 230: preserving free speech and creating a safer
Internet.233
With the threat of increased regulation looming on the horizon,
stakeholders are starting to feel the pressure and act on their own. On
January 7, 2021, Facebook’s Oversight Board reviewed Facebook’s
decision to restrict then-President Trump’s access to his account
indefinitely.234 The Board found that a temporary suspension was
appropriate but that an indefinite ban was excessively harsh, and
remanded to Facebook to render a proper penalty.235 Founded in 2019,
the Board is comprised of twenty academics, former politicians, and
activists who have the power to rule against Facebook’s moderation
actions.236 The Board will soon add twenty more members, and is being
touted as a vehicle for reforming the social media platform.237
Taking a different tack, former President Trump launched an
“alternative” social media platform in July 2021.238 The new app is called
“GETTR”—an amalgamation of “getting together”—and advertises
itself as “a non-bias social network for people all over the world.”239 Its
mission is to fight “cancel culture” and promote free speech.240
Ultimately, the platform has not enjoyed as much success as the former
President anticipated: shortly after its launch, the app was attacked by
hackers and more than 85,000 email addresses were stolen.241 Time will
tell if others try to start their own free speech-focused platforms.
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